Estimating Matching Games Without Individual-level Data: Multidimensional Sorting in Government Recruitment

Job Market Paper: This paper investigates the non-parametric identification of matching games and applies this framework to the analysis of matching mechanism design in government recruitment.

February 2024 ·  Qiwei He

Intra-firm Employer Learning, Talent Hoarding, and Worker Visibility (R&R Rand Journal of Economics)

In a firm with multiple hierarchical levels, we find that managers are incentivized to engage in talent hoarding. While managerial bonuses and job rotation policies may prevent talent hoarding, the existence of a subset of more visible workers could increase the likelihood of talent hoarding.

February 2024 ·  Qiwei He , Michael Waldman

Updating about Yourself by Learning about the Market: The Dynamics of Beliefs and Expectations in Job Search

We find that job seekers perceive a decrease of 18% in their subjective job-finding probability for each additional month of unemployment. However, job seekers perceive a higher job-finding probability when the aggregate unemployment rate is lower than they expected.

July 2023 ·  Qiwei He , Philipp Kircher

State Building and Civil Servant Fever in Contemporary China

We propose and demonstrate that the recruitment of talent from society into the regime represents a novel and significant consequence of state power expansion.

April 2023 · Bo Feng,  Qiwei He , Xin Jin, Xu Xu

Information Friction and Self-Selection into Government Employment in China

We find that misconceptions regarding financial rewards and career advancement prospects are widespread among college students in China. These misperceptions vary among students with different characteristics, such as ability and pro-social preferences, significantly influencing their career decisions.

March 2023 · Bo Feng,  Qiwei He , Hanzhang Liu

Superstar Spillovers in Teams: Evidence from the Chinese Super League

We identify that in team production settings, peer performances increase as they are exposed over time to superstars, indicating a positive dynamic spillover effect. Moreover, these spillovers are observed in the skill dimensions of peers that complement those of the superstars.

February 2023 ·  Qiwei He , Yu Liu

Centralized or Decentralized? An Empirical Model on Task Assignment of Government in Pandemics

We propose and estimate a dynamic game model to examine the welfare implications of decentralized versus centralized decision-making in formulating mitigation policies during the COVID-19 pandemic.

February 2023 ·  Qiwei He , Yizhou Kuang