we document that misperceptions about non-monetary and monetary aspects of government jobs are prevalent. When misperceptions are corrected, people with different prosocial attitudes significantly change their intentions to work for the government differently.

We document subjective duration dependence and overreactions to aggregate labor market shocks in job search.

We demonstrate that strenghening state capacity in one dimension through tax reform can significantly impact bureaucratic recruitment, i.e., another dimension of state capacity.

This paper investigates the non-parametric identification of matching games and applies this framework to the analysis of matching mechanism design in government recruitment.

In a firm with multiple hierarchical levels, we find that managers are incentivized to engage in talent hoarding. While managerial bonuses and job rotation policies may prevent talent hoarding, the existence of a subset of more visible workers could increase the likelihood of talent hoarding.

We identify that in team production settings, peer performances increase as they are exposed over time to superstars, indicating a positive dynamic spillover effect. Moreover, these spillovers are observed in the skill dimensions of peers that complement those of the superstars.

We propose and estimate a dynamic game model to examine the welfare implications of decentralized versus centralized decision-making in formulating mitigation policies during the COVID-19 pandemic.