Qiwei He何其蔚

Unemployed job seekers might worry about their chances of finding a job, especially if they remain unemployed longer or if labor market conditions turn out differently than expected. Using multiple survey samples, we find that unemployed job seekers anticipate significant declines in their job-finding probabilities over their unemployment duration and hold pessimistic views about the aggregate labor market compared to its evolution. However, they adjust their job-finding probabilities upward (downward) when the aggregate unemployment rate is unexpectedly low (high). An ``island" job search model with learning and overreaction given imperfect information fits the empirical patterns well. These beliefs can potentially offset a substantial portion of the negative consequences of moral hazard in job search. The new version supersedes an earlier version NBER w31940 under the title "Updating about Yourself by Learning about the Market: The Dynamics of Beliefs and Expectations in Job Search".

This paper empirically identifies the spillover effects of superstars on peers. Using detailed performance data from a high-stakes labor market environment – professional soccer in China – we find that the arrival of foreign superstars crowds out the performances of local peers. When the stars are absent from matches due to personal injuries, however, peer performances increase steadily with superstar exposure time, implying positive dynamic spillover effects. Spillovers concentrate on peers' skills that complement the stars'. Stars with higher market values exert greater spillovers on peers, while non-stars generate no spillovers

I study matching mechanism design in government recruitment, focusing on a primary method for recruiting bureaucrats in China: the National Civil Service Exam (NCSE). The NCSE is a centralized matching mechanism where each candidate can apply for one position before taking a meritocratic exam, causing strategic application. An econometric challenge arises in studying matching games in the absence of individual-level data. I propose a job-matching model with two-sided heterogeneity and demonstrate its nonparametric identification using position-level data. I apply the framework to estimate an empirical model of the NCSE. In the counterfactual analysis, I introduce a strategy-proof `first-exam-then-apply' mechanism. Simulations reveal that the NCSE can outperform the alternative mechanism when candidates' characteristics are multidimensional.

This paper develops a dynamic theory of jargon as a mechanism of social closure. We show that jargon is not simply a barrier to entry. It establishes a partially permeable boundary that regulates the speed and composition of knowledge diffusion. The model shows that a jargon equilibrium cannot involve perfect exclusion for outsiders, in which case jargon loses its strategic role. Nor can jargon be too easy: excessive leakage undermines the scarcity rents needed to sustain communication. We highlight macro-environment factors that shape the equilibrium difficulty of jargon. Introducing AI-assisted decoding does not mechanically dissolve social closure, but it can support a self-fulfilling defensive-opacity regime in which outsiders use decoding tools and insiders respond by making actual jargon harder.

Virtual residency interviews lowered travel costs but may have increased information frictions between applicants and programs. We study whether the 2021 transition to virtual interviews led residency programs to rely more on medical-school ties. Using restricted AMA National Graduate Medical Education Census data for the 2018–2021 entering cohorts, we compare categorical programs, which interviewed virtually for the 2021 cohort, with advanced programs, whose interviews largely occurred before the pandemic. A difference-in-differences model estimates a 6.1 percentage point increase in the share of incoming residents with medical-school ties among categorical programs relative to advanced programs in 2021. The results suggest that virtual interviews may have shifted programs toward greater reliance on institutional familiarity or personal networks when evaluating applicants.

This paper empirically studies how policy authority should be assigned when local governments pursue heterogeneous objectives but their policies create dynamic cross-border externalities. We estimate a dynamic game of COVID-19 mitigation policy among seven Northeastern U.S. states using an interstate network model of virus transmission. Using observed policies from March through May 2020, we recover each state government’s relative weights on mortality, employment loss, and policy-adjustment cost. In the counterfactual analysis, we find that a benevolent centralized agency leads to earlier tightening. A uniform centralized policy lowers population-weighted cost by 3.71 %, while state-specific central policy lowers it by 4.23 %.

This paper investigates how misperceptions about non-monetary and monetary aspects of government jobs affect individuals' propensity to choose civil service as a career in China. Based on a survey sample of more than 2,000 college students in China, we document the prevalence of misperceptions about government jobs in terms of promotion prospects, salary compensation, and housing benefits. When misperceptions are corrected using a survey experiment, we find that individuals who overestimate (underestimate) promotion prospects, salary compensation, and housing benefits significantly decrease (increase) their interest in government jobs. Moreover, we find that those who are more prosocial increase (decrease) their interest in government jobs more than others, when their underestimation (overestimation) of promotion prospects is corrected. These results point to the significant impact of individuals' (mis)perceptions about government jobs on bureaucratic selection, especially in terms of non-monetary aspects such as career prospects.

In a firm with multiple hierarchical levels, efficiency concerning promotion decisions can require information about worker abilities to be shared within the firm. We explore practices to improve intra-firm employer learning and the efficiency of promotion decisions. We find that firms can employ managerial bonuses and job rotation to improve intra-firm employer learning and avoid talent hoarding, but there are factors limiting the use of these practices. We also consider how equilibrium changes given heterogeneous worker visibility and compare our theoretical results to findings in the empirical literature.

Why are government jobs so attractive to talented individuals in many non-democratic countries? We identify state power as a key factor. We analyze the impact of China’s recent value-added tax reform, an expansion of taxation power, on citizens’ preferences for tax administration positions, as revealed by participation in the National Civil Service Exam. Using a difference-in-differences approach that leverages pre-reform subnational variation in tax composition and a dataset of 166,012 government job openings from 2010 to 2021, we find that the reform attracted more and higher-ability individuals to tax-related state positions. The effect is particularly strong for positions involving greater regulatory power or those located in prefectures with higher graft opportunities. An original survey reveals that exam takers perceive increased power and benefits in tax agencies after the reform.

Exploiting the variations in household income and consumption structure, this paper corrects the measurement errors of consumption expenditure reported by households in different income classes. By using the Urban Household Survey (UHS) data, empirical results demonstrate that consumption inequality in urban China increased by 67% during the sample period and it was much larger than 36%, which was obtained directly from the reported raw data. Precisely, from 1993 to 2007, the consumption inequality experienced a rapid increase, but began to decrease after 2008. Since 2002, underreporting of consumption expenditure was more evident for households with higher income. Furthermore, the consumption inequality in central and western regions, and that of the households with higher education levels were more serious and constituted important driving forces for the increase of consumption inequality.

Economics of Sport visits the most important economic aspects of the industry. We look at leading academic papers in the area to assess the empirical evidence and the theory that has been developed in the light of this evidence. We expect to cover the following topics: the theory of contests; the theory of demand for sporting events; the theory of leagues; superstar salaries in sports; the economic effect of mega sporting events; and migration and discrimination in professional sports.

An undergraduate course draws on many areas of public economics, including public goods, externalities, economics of education, poverty and income redistribution, income taxation and behavior, political selection, and local public finance. The econometric methods used build on a regression framework and focus on the challenges of estimating causal policy effects in non-experimental settings.

I worked as a teaching assistant at Cornell University during my PhD. The courses that I worked on include:

• NBA6950 Game Theory and Business Strategy, taught by Professor Yi Chen
• NCC5020 Microeconomics for Management, taught by Professor Michael Waldman and Professor Yi Chen
• NCCT5020 Microeconomics for Management, taught by Professor Robert Frank

I worked as a teaching assistant at Fudan University. The courses that I worked on include:

• ECON110030.01 Chinese Economic Reform and Political Change, taught by Professor Jiahua Che
• EMAE620014 China's Taxation System and Fiscal Policy, taught by Professor Yu Liu
• EMAE630024 Topics on Development Economics, taught by Professor Xican Xi